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1. Methodology to provide acceptance and legitimacy for the CJEU 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) performs to different 
audiences. The quality of the performance will be harshly judged by these 
audiences. From time to time, the Court receives criticism under different labels. 
How can the Court avoid being criticised for its performance? Effectively, how 
can the Court receive the acceptance of its audiences? Eckes states that ‘sound 
legal method can ensure acceptance and recognition’.1 This is my starting point. 
 In order to be accepted in the legal context of the EU, the CJEU should rely 
on sound methodology. This thesis will provide a theory about what such a 
methodology could, or perhaps should, look like. In this work, I will identify 
four key components of a methodological framework which seeks to provide the 
Court with acceptance and legitimacy. While I prefer the term ‘acceptance’,2 seeing 
as this study is focused on what the Court should do in order to avoid criticism 
from its audiences, I will still include ‘legitimacy’ since it is a term that is usually 
used in this context.3 Let me put it this way: if the Court’s work receives the 
acceptance of its audiences, it can be deemed legitimate. To me, legitimacy is a 
juridically framed consequence of acceptance. With that said, the methodological 
framework will, principally, settle for ‘acceptance’. Some might say that 
‘legitimacy’ requires something beyond merely ‘avoiding criticism’. Perhaps there 
is more to legitimacy than that – perhaps the Court needs to provide ‘justice’, or 
something like it, to be legitimate. Regardless of such a view, the purpose of this 
thesis is to identify a methodological framework which enables the Court to 
avoid criticism on a methodological basis, and to me, this intention means that 
the methodological framework will also provide the Court with legitimacy, since 
its work will be deemed acceptable by the audiences in the EU legal context. 
 
1 Eckes, C., ‘European Union Legal Methods – Moving Away from Integration’, in Neergaard 
U. and Nielsen, R. (eds.), European Legal Method: Towards a New European Legal Realism, DJØF 
Publishing, Copenhagen, 2013, p. 179. 
2 Mainly used on account on the inspiration from Paunio, E., Legal Certainty in Multilingual EU 
Law: Language, Discourse and Reasoning at the European Court of Justice, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012, 
where she states, for example, that the work of courts must be ‘rationally acceptable to the legal 
community in question’ on p. 53. 
3 See for example Adams, M. et al., ’Introduction: Judging Europe’s Judges’, in Adams, M. et al. 
(eds.), Judging Europe’s Judges: The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice, Hart, 
Oxford, 2013, p. 3. 
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 Handed down in the spring of 2020, PSPP4 is the case that sparked my 
inspiration for this work, and the interesting situation it gave rise to, seeing as 
the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) was so unhappy with the 
Court’s application of the principle of proportionality in Weiss5 that it declared 
the decision ultra vires in Germany. As I will make clear in the following, the 
scope of this thesis extends beyond these cases, but the situation remains eye-
catching. To me, this is the kind of criticism that the Court, through sound 
methodology, must seek to avoid. Not only did PSPP make me wonder about 
the details (or components, as I have come to call them) of ‘sound methodology’, 
I also wanted to see whether effects (or consequences in the terminology of this 
thesis) did have a place among those details. Do consequences hold any position, 
pronounced or unpronounced, in the methodological framework? While I admit 
that it was the FCC’s strong reaction in PSPP that put this question in my mind, 
I maintain that there is an interesting discussion to be had about the position of 
consequences in the Court’s methodology, even though it may seem provocative 
just to mention it as a possibility (some might say that the Court is not a legislator 
and that it should not reason from consequences etc.).  
 Furthermore, the title of the thesis needs to be commented. Without giving 
it all away, I will submit that the study does find some compelling arguments for 
the inclusion of consequences in the methodological framework. In my view, 
the value of proportionality6 carries such importance for the Member States that 
such a demand of proportionality serves as an interesting counterweight to the 
EU perspective’s expectations on the direct effect and primacy – or simply, the 
effectiveness – of Union law. As you will see, I thus argue that a methodological 
framework that recognises the Member States’ demand for proportionality is 
indeed more suitable for providing the Court with acceptance and legitimacy in 
the Union legal context. That being said, the purpose of this thesis, i.e. 
identifying a methodological framework with the capacity to provide the Court 
with such acceptance and legitimacy, will be fulfilled in two Parts. 
 
4 Judgment of the Second Senate of 05 May 2020, 2 BvR 859/15, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2020: 
rs20200505.2bvr085915, hereinafter PSPP. 
5 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 11 December 2018, Weiss, C-493/17, ECLI: 
EU:C:2018:1000, hereinafter Weiss. 
6 I will elaborate on this below, see section 7 and section 10. 
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 In Part I, which follows this Introduction, the four key components of the 
methodological framework will be identified, and described one at the time. 
Then, in Part II, I will analyse the position of consequences in this 
methodological framework. The analysis will build on the components as they 
were presented in Part I. In addition to this, the components will be revised and 
specified as their continued assessment is carried out in Part II. Before we get to 
those two Parts, however, section 2 elaborates on the relevance of the PSPP and 
Weiss cases, and section 3 provides some theoretical and methodological 
remarks. The rest of the thesis has the following outline.  
 Section 4 is the beginning of Part I and describes the Court’s legal reasoning 
and teleological interpretation. Section 5 provides an overview of the Court’s 
approach to precedent, while section 6 elaborates on the legal context and the 
communicative situation the Court finds itself in. Section 7 will touch on the 
importance of legal principles in EU law and section 8 provides a summary of 
the components presented in Part I. Section 9 begins Part II and provides a 
reminder about why we should care about the CJEU’s methodology. Section 10 
consists of a discussion of the position of consequences in the methodological 
framework, and is divided into three subsections. While section 10.1 and 10.2 
revisits the components in the methodological framework, section 10.3 provides 
an illustration of a concept I have called ‘methodological deficit’. Lastly, section 
11 concludes Part II, and thus also the thesis, with a brief summary. 
 With that said, we now look into some of the details of what actually 
transpired when the FCC in PSPP voiced some serious complaints regarding the 
Court’s methodology in Weiss. 
 
2. The demands on methodology – a methodological framework 
Giving its decision in Weiss, the CJEU ruled that there was no reason to doubt 
the validity of Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the European Central Bank of 4 
March 2015 on a secondary markets public sector asset programme (PSPP, for 
short).7 Interestingly, the FCC then took issue with not only the decision in the 
judgment, but also the Court’s methodological approach. In PSPP, the German 
 
7 Weiss, supra note 5, para 168. 
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court initially recognised that the CJEU, creating its ‘methodological standards 
[…] based on the (constitutional) legal traditions common to the Member 
States’, enjoys a margin of error when it uses these standards to interpret and 
apply the Treaties.8 Put differently, the methodological standards and margin of 
error combines for, as I call it, a methodological framework within which the Court 
must operate in order to receive the acceptance of national courts such as the  
FCC. If the Court was to step outside of this framework when interpreting and 
applying the Treaties, ‘its actions are no longer covered by the mandate 
conferred’ upon it, the FCC concludes.9 Let me make clear, though, that this 
thesis extends far beyond the scope of the situation of the PSPP and Weiss cases. 
This situation is used as an example for two reasons: first, the cases provide a 
good entry into the subject of methodology (even though some might argue that 
the FCC’s standpoint is more focused on the principle of proportionality 
specifically than methodology in general) and, second, they showcase the 
importance of the subject of methodology, seeing as the FCC subsequently 
declared the Weiss-decision ultra vires with reference to the Court’s lacking 
methodology. The thesis will, following this entrance into the subject, proceed 
to a description of a methodological framework which, on the one hand, can be 
applied to the CJEU’s work in general and, on the other hand, may be utilised to 
understand specific cases like PSPP/Weiss. In short, the methodological framework 
is a theory about the CJEU. 
Turning back to PSPP, then, it should be remarked that the FCC asserted that 
the Court in Weiss failed to take account of the effects of the PSPP in such an 
apparent manner that the ‘review of proportionality [was] rendered 
meaningless’.10 Accusing the CJEU of neglecting to make an appropriate 
balancing of the interests at stake in the case, the FCC stated: 
 
When applied in this manner, as undertaken by the CJEU, the principle of 
proportionality enshrined in Art. 5(1) second sentence and Art. 5(4) TEU 
cannot fulfil its corrective function for the purposes of safeguarding the 
 
8 PSPP, supra note 4, para 112. 
9 Ibid, para 113. 
10 Ibid, para 133. 
10 
 
competences of the Member States. The complete disregard of the PSPP’s 
economic policy effects means that already the determination of the ESCB’s 
objectives is not comprehensible from a methodological perspective […] given that 
suitability and necessity of the PSPP are not balanced against the economic 
policy effects […]. This contradicts the methodological approach taken by 
the CJEU in virtually all other areas of EU law.11 
 
It is indeed interesting to observe the severity of the wording with which the 
FCC attacked the Court’s methodological performance. At the very least, this sends a 
clear signal of how important this issue is to the German court.12 In summary, 
the FCC considered the CJEU’s methodology in Weiss to be so lacking that the 
decision had to be declared ultra vires.13 
 It was thus the method with which the principle of proportionality was 
applied that failed to convince the German court. In this sense, the CJEU did 
not put enough emphasis on the consequences of the program (PSPP) at hand 
in the case. Conversely, I argue that this means that the FCC would not have 
declared the Weiss-decision ultra vires if the CJEU had in fact analysed the 
consequences of the PSPP more thoroughly. This is the idea that has provided 
the inspiration for the question posed in the Part II of this thesis: should 
consequences be included in a theory about a methodological framework of the 
CJEU? My focus on consequences in Part II thus stems from the FCC’s strong 
reaction in PSPP, but, again, the study extends beyond that particular judgment. 
Rather, the idea is to analyse whether a methodological framework that includes 
consequences could be more successful in providing acceptance and legitimacy 
for the CJEU’s work among the different audiences of the Union legal context 
than a methodological framework that does not openly include consequences in 
that manner. 
 Before turning to the discussion of what position consequences specifically could 
hold in such a framework (Part II), however, we need to identify the general 
components that build into the CJEU’s methodological framework (Part I). First 
 
11 Ibid. Italics added. 
12 Regarding ‘judicial signalling’, see section 10.2 below. 
13 PSPP, supra note 4, para 154. 
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of all, though, a few comments regarding some of the methodological and 
theoretical issues in this thesis are in order. 
 
3. Methodological and theoretical considerations in a theoretical study 
of methodology  
This is a study of methodology in the CJEU. Despite the associations such a 
notion may bring to mind, it is not a study of the case law of the CJEU (which is 
remarkably evident if you, reader, were to take a quick look at the content of the 
reference list). Rather, it is a study that seeks to identify a methodological 
framework that can provide acceptance and legitimacy for the Court, based on 
previous research including both theoretical and practical analyses of the CJEU’s 
work. This particular statement demands, in my view, answers to two questions: 
Why not carry out a study of the Court’s case law if you want to describe its 
methodology? How is this thesis different from the previous research seemingly 
already available on the subject? 
First of all, the nature of the type of work this thesis is has not allowed for 
such a comprehensive study of the CJEU’s case law. There would simply not 
have been enough time to complete a useful work employing that method. This 
is the case since such a work would also have needed to be based on some sort 
of a theoretical structure against which the case law was assessed. Suffice it to 
say that some effort would thus have been needed to be put into constructing 
or identifying some sort of a theoretical framework anyway. With that said, it 
would indeed have been interesting to ‘test’ the theory of the particular 
methodological framework proposed below against a substantive body of the 
Court’s case law in order to see whether this theory can in fact help the 
understanding of certain features of the Court’s work. Another aspect to the 
choice of method in this thesis is the intention of employing a wider view of which 
components may be identified as parts of the methodological framework. If the thesis 
was confined to being a study of case law from the CJEU, this intention would 
have been, in my view, hindered by the fact that the study of components would 
have been limited to the Court’s own perspective. Rather, it is more interesting 
to consult the available research, in order to receive perspectives and viewpoints 
different from those that may be attained from a pure study of case law. This 
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way, I feel confident in saying that I have made an attempt to identify the key 
components of the methodological framework proposed here, without a 
significant risk of overlooking one or several relevant aspects or features that 
can be associated with the CJEU’s methodology. Still, as suggested above, in a 
context where the format would have allowed for it, a study of the Court’s 
methodology that could combine a theoretical outlook (perhaps along the lines 
of what is presented here in this thesis) with an elaborate study of case law would 
probably yield interesting results.  
In summary, seeing as a combined study of that type would have been well 
beyond the timeframe of this thesis, I have focused on laying down the 
‘groundwork’ of such a theoretical perspective, by identifying a methodological 
framework of the CJEU. While this methodological framework does not make 
any claim to be the only way to understand the Court’s work, I argue that it 
provides a starting point for those interested in the key aspects that influence the 
way the CJEU carries out its task. Additionally, the methodological framework 
is based on the underlying idea that the Court’s work needs to be accepted in the 
Union legal context. This particular notion of acceptance in the context within 
which the Court is embedded is discussed in section 6 below and identified as 
one of the key components of the methodological framework. Speaking of this 
view of the legal context as a ‘methodological component’, we turn to the other 
of the two questions posed above. 
Secondly, this thesis is different from most of the works on methodology in 
the CJEU. Framing it in that way, however, is somewhat misleading – seeing as 
there is not much written about the ‘methodology of the CJEU’. The legal 
reasoning of the CJEU, though, is another story! Here, the doctrine is rich. 
Wandering this particular land of EU research, I came across Gunnar Beck’s The 
Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU14 which has provided a great deal of 
inspiration for this thesis. In a somewhat different area of research, one finds 
Elina Paunio’s Legal Certainty in Multilingual EU Law15 – another work that has 
influenced this thesis considerably. While these two works cover different parts 
of the field of CJEU-research, they have one thing in common; they describe 
 
14 Beck, G., The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, Hart, Oxford, 2012. 
15 Paunio, 2012, supra note 2. 
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aspects of EU law that inform and influence the methodology of the CJEU, or, 
put differently, aspects that make for important components of the CJEU’s 
methodological framework.  
Returning to the question of how this thesis is different from works such as 
Beck’s or Paunio’s, the short answer is that this thesis looks to bring the insights 
from authors as Beck (pertaining to the legal reasoning of the Court) and insights 
from authors as Paunio (pertaining to the legal context of the Court) together in 
one context. Only by utilising a more extensive perspective, I argue, can a 
comprehensive notion of a methodological framework of the CJEU be established. 
On this point I might add that while Beck, for example, uses a very broad view 
of ‘legal reasoning’, which enables him to include a variety of aspects which he 
finds to be of interest within the context of reasoning, I understand legal 
reasoning in a narrower sense. Beck’s concept of legal reasoning comes really 
close to a concept of methodology. At this stage, I find that if ‘legal reasoning’ 
becomes almost indistinguishable from ‘method’ or ‘methodology’, the 
understanding of the CJEU’s work becomes hindered. Put differently, a wide 
concept of legal reasoning will only get you so far. It may enable an analysis of 
several interesting aspects, but if there are certain methodological characteristics 
‘left-over’ that do not relate to reasoning, they cannot be considered within a 
theory of a ‘legal reasoning framework’ that seeks to explain the Court’s work. 
Instead, the methodological framework proposed in this thesis thus promotes a 
narrow concept of legal reasoning as one of its key components. With that said, 
this framework consists not only of the two components of the legal reasoning 
and legal context of the CJEU, but also its approach to previous case law as well as 
the legal principles of EU law. These components are described below in Part I, and 
subsequently added into the methodological framework, illustrated by a larger 
box containing the four components in smaller boxes. After the framework 
illustration has been completed, I will turn in Part II to the question of the 
position of consequences in this methodological framework.  
Briefly, it can be noted that the order in which the components are presented 
in Part I does not represent their comparative importance with regard to each 
other. The order of presentation is neutral on this point. Suffice it to say that 
they carry importance from different perspectives. The understanding of the 
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Court as embedded in its broader context is of crucial importance for the 
perspective that the Court needs to seek acceptance and legitimacy in the first 
place. In this sense, this component may be seen as the most important from 
the standpoint employed in this work. The other components, however, are 
crucial – as I see them – for a methodology that provides such acceptance and 
legitimacy. The order of presentation of the components is thus not decisive, 
since the main point is that it is the whole, the four of them together in a 
methodological framework, that is of interest here. 
To summarise the points made thus far, this is a study which seeks to, first, 
propose a theory of a methodological framework that seeks to explain the 
CJEU’s work from a methodological point of view and, second, examine the 
position of consequences or consequential analysis in this framework. The study 
draws on previous literature that has described and analysed the concepts and 
features of EU law that influence the Court’s methodology, but seeks to bring 
these insights together in one context, illustrated by a methodological framework.  
In order to identify these particular concepts and features, I have adopted an 
institutional approach, which allows for a ‘dynamic perspective’ rather than a ‘static 
understanding of law’.16 This is necessary because a static legal analysis of the 
main sources of EU law – the Treaties and the CJEU’s case law – would not be 
able to identify all relevant aspects of the Court’s methodology. Instead, it is 
required that the CJEU’s institutional position, embedded in the broader legal 
and political context of the European Union, can be taken into account. With a 
static understanding of law, certain aspects relevant to the understanding of the 
methodology of the CJEU may remain untouched or unidentified. Maintaining 
a dynamic perspective can thus facilitate a deeper understanding of the CJEU’s 
work and function. This is true especially since the ‘process of adjudication 
[itself] will necessarily have to be dynamic’ in a context where the Court has to 
apply ‘law [that] is increasingly interlinking different sets of interests’ and is 
‘expected to weigh and reconcile the relevant interests’ on its own.17  
 
16 Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, A., ’Institutionell teori och metod’, in F. Korling and M. Zamboni 
(eds.), Juridisk metodlära, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2013, p. 271, my translation. 
17 Adams, 2013, supra note 3, p. 2. 
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 On this point, the thesis largely follows the standpoint adopted in European 
Legal Method: Towards a New European Legal Realism,18 and Nielsen’s notion of ‘one 
big system’: 
 
Institutional legal theory has contributed significantly to understanding 
law as a phenomenon that function beyond the nation states. In my view 
the functioning of EU law beyond the state is better understood if EU 
law, the domestic law of the Member States and at least the European 
parts of public international law are seen as forming ‘one big system’.19 
 
It is in this particular sense that I commit to an institutional approach, utilising 
an understanding of EU law as one big system beyond domestic law. It is not 
necessarily to allow for a more ‘open and including attitude to relevant source 
material’.20 What is essential for this thesis is instead the realisation that the CJEU 
is ‘embedded in [its] broader political environment’.21 Put differently, the 
possibility of taking into account the ‘broader social, economic and cultural 
context’ that law and legal rules exist in22 that an institutional approach provides 
thus enables a perspective that the Court should be seen as part of the ‘one big 




18 Nielsen, R., ‘New European Legal Realism – New Problems, New Solutions?’, in Neergaard 
U. and Nielsen, R. (eds.), European Legal Method: Towards a New European Legal Realism, DJØF 
Publishing, Copenhagen, 2013, pp. 75-124. 
19 Ibid, p. 121.  
20 Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, 2013, supra note 16, p. 268, my translation. 
21 Dyevre, A., ‘Outline of a Legal Realistic Approach to Legal Integration’, in Neergard, U. and 
Nielsen, R. (eds.), European Legal Method: Towards a New European Legal Realism, DJØF Publishing, 
Copenhagen, 2013, p. 68. 














4. CJEU’s legal reasoning and interpretation  
With all introductory remarks out of the way, we now turn to constructing the 
methodological framework-theory that is proposed in this thesis. The theory is 
based on the identification of four methodological components, and the first 
component pertains to the legal reasoning of the Court. This component is also 
the only one in the methodological framework that actually has a piece of written 
EU law clearly attached to it. From Article 36 in the Statute of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU Statute’ below) thus follows that 
judgments shall state the reasons on which they are based. Interestingly, though, 
this is essentially the only provision of written law which governs the legal 
reasoning of the CJEU. And it does not really govern the legal reasoning of the 
CJEU. It only demands that the Court state the reasons behind its decision-
making. The provision in Article 36 is important, of course – for example from 
a legal certainty-point of view – but it seems superficial and quite uninformative 
for those interested in understanding in what way legal reasoning builds into the 
CJEU’s methodology. Put differently, I submit that merely ‘stating reasons’ is 
not the same as the concept of ‘legal reasoning’. The stated reasons may provide 
certain hints about the reasoning behind some of the decisions and 
interpretations in a specific case, but it does not paint a full picture of the actual 
reasoning that took place. More importantly, a narrow concept of stated reasons 
is not at all of the same interest from a methodological point of view as a more 
comprehensive understanding of the concept of legal reasoning. Again, Article 
36 is thus not very helpful if you are looking for knowledge about the CJEU’s 
legal reasoning. In order to understand reasoning beyond the stated reasons, we 
must ask the question of what then, if not written provisions of EU law, feeds 
into the design of the legal reasoning of the Court? 
 Before turning to the answer to this question, which encapsulates the purpose 
of this section, I will briefly clarify my use of the term legal reasoning. I have 
already touched on the fact that legal reasoning should be understood in a 
narrow sense for the purposes of this thesis in section 3. Bengoetxea, 
MacCormick, and Moral note that ‘[b]y analysing the legal reasoning of the 
Court, one draws attention to how the Court takes account of reasons – legal 
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norms, values, principles, policies - to justify its decisions’.23 In my view, legal 
reasoning should thus be understood as the effort to justify a decision or an 
interpretation. While it is not certain that the Court itself feels the need to justify 
its decisions and interpretations – perhaps it merely feels obliged to explain them 
– I maintain that the purpose of the methodological framework, which is to 
provide the CJEU with acceptance, makes the methodological understanding of 
legal reasoning as a way of justifying decisions and interpretations valid, 
regardless of the Court’s self-perception. The audiences will still demand 
justification. Returning to the question above, we shall now take a closer look at 
what builds into the design of the legal reasoning of the CJEU. 
The FCC actually touched on it in PSPP and, as mentioned above, the CJEU 
is expected to create its methodological approach with inspiration from the legal 
traditions common to the Member States.24 Put differently, ‘in justifying its 
decisions the [CJEU] is bound by the constraints of judicial reasoning accepted 
in the EU legal system’.25 Furthermore, the legal reasoning used by the Court 
‘should correspond, as much as possible, to the traditional understanding of 
judicial reasoning’.26 Being a sentiment of this, the CJEU’s legal reasoning as a 
means of justifying its decisions mainly consists of so-called formal reasoning, 
meaning that the legitimacy of the Court stems from the ‘recognition of, and not 
creation of, the law’.27 
 Poiares Maduro has pointed out that the use of formal reasoning by the CJEU 
made it possible to present the European integration through expansion of 
Union law ‘as a logical process of legal reasoning’.28 It must be noted, however, 
that a long time has passed since the CJEU first adopted this style of reasoning, 
in the beginning of the European integration. With this in mind, it seems 
relatively easy to agree with Poiares Maduro when he declares that: 
 
23 Bengoetxea, J., MacCormick, N., and Moral, L. ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal 
Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’, in de Búrca, G. and Weiler, J.H.H., The European 
Court of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 44. Italics added. 
24 PSPP, supra note 4, para 112. 
25 Paunio, 2012, supra note 2, p. 22. 
26 Poiares Maduro, M., We the Court: the European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution: A Critical Reading of Article 30 of the EC Treaty, Hart, Oxford, 1998, p. 10. 
27 Ibid, p. 10. 




The adoption of formal reasoning as a model of justification in the Court’s 
decisions is, in part, a consequence of legal traditions in Member States, 
that are, nevertheless, becoming outdated.29 
 
Thus, while formal reasoning is still needed to maintain principles of certainty 
and equality, it is ‘no longer sufficient’30 in the legal culture of the European 
Union today. Additionally, this particular model of justification means that the 
exercise of discretion in the Court’s reasoning stays concealed, as no ‘second-order 
justification’ is provided.31 In short, formal reasoning is superficial in the same 
way as the provision in Article 36 of the CJEU Statute is superficial: there is no 
demand for justification beyond the formal reasons for the decisions and 
interpretations. What then lies behind the formal reasoning that needs 
justification? What guides the choices and decisions made by the Court beyond 
the formal reasons presented in the judgment? This is where we turn to the 
subject of interpretation. To be clear, this section does not look to provide a 
thorough analysis of legal interpretation. Rather, the purpose is to present the 
subject on a descriptive level that is sufficient to illustrate how the concept of 
interpretation is important for the understanding of legal reasoning as a 
component of the CJEU’s methodological framework. 
 Generally, there are mainly four models of interpretation, all providing the 
Court with different discretional scope, that can be distinguished – consisting of 
historical interpretation, literal interpretation, systematic interpretation and 
teleological interpretation.32 The moment in which interpretation enters the 
process of adjudication has been expressed in different ways. Put simply, the 
CJEU ‘must apply European law where its meaning is clear, and must interpret 
it where its meaning is not clear’.33 According to this view, some cases will 
involve no interpretation. However, the process of determining whether a case 
 
29 Ibid, p. 22. Italics added. 
30 Ibid, p. 20. 
31 Ibid. 





is clear can be said to ‘already includ[e] an interpretative evaluation of the case 
in question’.34 Regardless of which stance one prefers, interpretation is an 
important part of the legal reasoning of the CJEU, considering that, on the one 
hand, the majority of cases before the CJEU are hard35 and, on the other hand, 
the indeterminacy of EU law is a cause for judicial discretion,36 which in turn is 
exercised through interpretation. 
 Between the four interpretational models presented above, the CJEU has 
famously leaned towards the teleological one, seeing as it has preferred a 
‘purposive style’.37 It has been argued that this approach is ‘especially well suited 
to the problems of interpretation to which the [Union] law sometimes give 
rise’.38 There are two main reasons for the suitability of a teleological model: the 
manner in which provisions of EU law have been drafted and the multilingual 
character of EU law.39 It has been claimed that the provisions of the Treaties 
and other EU legislation have, on the one hand, been drafted with a ‘high degree 
of vagueness’ and, on the other hand, a ‘teleological theme written into [their] 
texture’.40 While it is true, then, that it is the dominant style of interpretation, the 
CJEU ‘refers not only to teleological arguments but also to systemic and 
contextual as well as linguistic arguments’.41  In fact, as Paunio puts it, reasoning 
based on teleological considerations is ‘particularly persuasive […] when tied to 
systemic arguments’.42 In summary, it is accurate to describe the interpretational 
model employed by the CJEU in its legal reasoning as a teleological one which 
does not leave linguistic and systemic arguments completely out of the picture.  
 The objective of this section has been to show that the legal reasoning of the 
CJEU is built in no small part around the interpretational model the Court has 
chosen. In the Court’s work, interpretation plays an important role because of 
 
34 Paunio, 2012, supra note 2, p. 23. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Poiares Maduro, 1998, supra note 26, pp. 17-18. 
37 Bengoetxea et al., 2001 supra note 23, p. 45. See also Arnull, A., The European Union and its Court 
of Justice, 2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 515. 
38 Arnull, 2006, supra note 37, p. 515. 
39 Ibid, p. 517. 
40 Beck, 2012, supra note 14, p. 157. 
41 Paunio, 2012, supra note 2, p. 42. 
42 Ibid, p. 45. 
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the problems posed by vagueness and multilingualism in EU law. In order to 
address these challenges, the Court has adopted a teleological method of 
interpretation. To avoid going beyond the introductory purpose of this section, 
I have stayed at a brief overview and not gone too deep into the vast subject that 
is interpretation in legal reasoning. More constructive comments will be 
provided in Part II (see especially section 10.1), where I build on the points 
presented above. For those further interested in the interpretational nitty-gritty 
of the CJEU, I refer to the several already existing works on this subject (some 
of which are cited in this thesis).  
 Returning to the overriding topic of methodology, some clarifications may 
be in order. I believe that my use of the word ‘methodology’ is best explained 
by relativising it to other components of the terminology used in the thesis up 
to this point. The methodology of the CJEU should be understood in a broad 
sense for the purposes of this thesis. It is the methodological framework, and 
the boundaries it imposes, within which the CJEU must operate in order to 
ensure the acceptance and legitimacy of its work when it decides a case and 
presents its decision in a judgment. In doing so, presenting the judgment, the 
Court has recourse to legal reasoning. An integral piece of the legal reasoning of 
the CJEU is, as shown above, teleological interpretation. Hence, one component 
of the CJEU’s methodological framework is legal reasoning, and a sub-
component to the legal reasoning of the CJEU is teleological interpretation. This 
relationship between the concepts of methodology, legal reasoning, and 




Much of the work done on the Court’s legal reasoning paints a picture where 
the concept of legal reasoning is equivalent to the concept of method (see the 
discussion above in section 3 regarding Beck’s view on legal reasoning), but I 
would like to distinguish between the two, and thus argue that legal reasoning 
only is one part of the methodology of the CJEU. To be sure, it is a critical part, 
but it can still be seen as one component among others. Moreover, the other 
methodological components described in the following sections, can be said to 
‘inform the reasoning’, but it is still possible to maintain a distinction between 
them. In short, legal reasoning may be recognised as the Court’s ‘methodological 
voice’.43 As we move towards filling out the methodological framework 
illustration sketched out above, the focus will now be shifted to how recognition 
of precedent plays a part in the CJEU’s methodology. 
 
5. CJEU’s approach to precedent 
Put simply, the CJEU ‘is not bound by its previous decisions but in practice it 
does not often depart from them’.44 This position should be understood in the 
context of what the Court was when it was established. At this stage, the Court 
 
43 I expand on this in the summarising section 8, seeing as it is better explained once the other 
components of the methodological framework have been described. 
44 Arnull, 2006, supra note 37, p. 529. 
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was the decision-maker of first and last resort, and seeing as its decisions could 
only be changed through the hefty process of Treaty amendment, it was 
‘imperative that the Court [had] the power to change the direction of its case-
law’.45 Moreover, the understanding of the approach of the CJEU to its previous 
case law is furthered not only by knowledge about the ‘institutional’ position the 
Court received within the Union when the latter was formed, but also by its 
‘traditional’ position between civil law and common law perspectives. On this 
point, the Court is considered to lean towards the civilian tradition in which 
judges ‘[do] not feel compelled to analyse or reconcile the earlier judgments in 
the manner of the common law judge’.46 In summary, the original position of 
the CJEU within the Union legal order and to some extent the heritage of the 
civil law tradition combines for the fundamental view that the Court is not 
unconditionally bound by its previous case law. 
Ultimately, though, it is evident that the CJEU ‘pay[s] strong regard to over-
time coherence of the decisions [it] hand[s] down’.47 Additionally, the specific 
nature of Union law and its vagueness have provided for the role of case law as a 
‘source of consistent interpretation and […] legal certainty’.48 In fact, the Court 
has increasingly referred to previous case law in its judgments. Beck looked at 
the 314 judgments from the Court in 2011 that had been made available in 
English, and found that the Court referred to previous case law in 303 of them.49 
In 116 of these 303 judgments, the CJEU ‘appealed at least once to the ‘settled 
case law’ on a particular point of law’.50 Regarding such a policy in the approach 
to previous case law, it can be concluded that the recognition of precedent clearly 
influences the methodology of the CJEU.  
For the purposes of this thesis, there is merit to drawing on Beck’s distinction 
between interpretative precedents and self-standing precedents.51 In his view, 
interpretative precedents replace a written norm with an authoritative 
 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, p. 530. 
47 Bengoetxea et al., 2001, supra note 23, p. 46. 
48 Beck, 2012, supra note 14, p. 237. 
49 Ibid, p. 239. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Beck, 2012, supra note 14, p. 236. 
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interpretation in a judge-made rule and self-standing precedents are constructed 
when the Court fills ‘gaps’ in the Union law.52 The latter category essentially 
creates rules or norms within the legal system in question. In Union law, it is 
‘gap-closing’ self-standing precedents of the CJEU which have provided for 
fundamental principles such as ‘supremacy, direct effect and harmonious 
interpretation […] which in turn underlie key developments in the law of judicial 
protection’.53 Interpretative precedents, on the other hand, are less remarkable 
and they make up ‘by far the largest number of EU precedents’.54 It is, 
nonetheless, these ‘every-day-precedents’ that are of the biggest interest here. 
Crucially, the interpretative precedents have a ‘dual nature […] as both 
interpretative arguments and rules’.55 Put differently, they aid the ‘construction 
[of] interpretative criteria in the application of legal rules’ while they also 
‘generally represent more or less binding quasi-rules about how to interpret 
certain provisions’.56  
In this context, I would like to propose a concept of methodological precedents. 
Some of the interpretative precedents would then be regarded as methodological 
in character inasmuch they produce a demand for a certain way of application of a 
rule which is applicable to the case in question. This concept would then be a 
sub-category to interpretative precedents and differs from that general category 
of precedents since the norm established by a methodological precedent does 
not merely demand a certain interpretation of a rule or provision of Union law but 
rather a specific methodology with which the interpretation and application of a rule or 
provision is carried out by the Court. I will return to methodological precedents 
in Part II,57 seeing as the main purpose of Part I is to provide a level of detail 
regarding these general components that is sufficient for the inclusion of them 
in the methodological framework to seem warranted. It is my view that the more 
analytical comments are better suited for Part II, which to some extent utilises 
 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid, p. 242. 
54 Ibid, p. 240. 
55 Ibid, p. 107. 
56 Ibid, p. 107. 
57 See specifically section 10.2. 
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PSPP/Weiss as examples in order to reduce the level of abstraction in the 
discussion of this methodological framework.  
For now, it will thus suffice to add recognition of precedent as a main 
component, seeing as ‘the very fabric of judicial legitimacy would be threatened 
if courts paid no attention and felt in no way constrained by their own previous 
decisions’,58 and the category of interpretative precedents as a sub-component 
to the illustration of the methodological framework introduced in section 4.  
 
With that said, we now move on to the next piece of the methodological 
framework puzzle, namely the aspect of EU law often referred to as the dialogue 
between the Court and not only the national courts, but also other participants 
in the Union legal context. 
 
6. CJEU in the Union legal context and the communicative situation 
In describing the legal context within which the CJEU finds itself, the 
preliminary ruling procedure appears to be a natural point of departure. The 
purpose here, however, is not to provide a description of the material features 
of this procedure, which concern, for instance, questions of the scope (i.e. 
questions such as ‘courts which may refer’, ‘matters which may be referred’ and 
 
58 Beck, 2012, supra note 14, p. 339. 
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‘discretion or obligation to refer’) or of the operation (i.e. questions of ‘form and 
transmission of the reference’, ‘suspension of the proceedings before the 
national court’, ‘appeal against the reference’, etc.) of the procedure.59 Rather, 
the objective is to clarify why it is important that this procedure is considered 
when identifying the components of the methodological framework. 
 Because of the preliminary ruling procedure, the CJEU is in a ‘constant 
dialogue with the national courts’.60 The term ‘dialogue’ is common in the 
discussion of the preliminary ruling procedure. For the purposes of this thesis, 
however, I rely on a broader concept of dialogue, not confined to the interaction 
between the CJEU and national courts within this procedure. Instead, this 
methodological framework builds on the idea of a communicative situation – 
consisting of a ‘dialogue between [the] relevant parties’ – as it has been presented 
by Paunio.61 In my view, this perspective is clearly enabled by an institutional 
approach to law, which provides a theoretical outlook that facilitates an 
understanding of the Court as an institution embedded in a broader context.  
 Before expanding on Paunio’s slightly broader view and the communicative 
situation, the preliminary ruling procedure deserves further comment, especially 
since the ‘case law on preliminary rulings […] has a critical impact upon the way 
in which the national and EU legal systems interact and communicate’.62 
Furthermore, the preliminary rulings serve to fulfil a variety of functions besides 
framing the relationship between national courts and the CJEU, such as 
providing a ‘mechanism for discourse between Member States, the CJEU, and 
the Union institutions’ or representing a ‘cornerstone of compliance with the 
principle of effective judicial protection’.63 Of the most interest here is the so-
called ‘mechanism for discourse’. De la Mare and Donnelly explain their 
preference for ‘discourse’ over ‘dialogue’ with reference to the fact that the 
 
59 For such an overview, see chapter 4 in Lasok, K.P.E., Millet, T., and Howard, A., Judicial 
Control in the EU: Procedures and Principles, Richmond Law & Tax, Richmond, 2004, pp. 308-361. 
60 Rosas, A., ‘The European Court of Justice in Context: Forms and Patterns of Judicial 
Dialogue’, European Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, 2008, p. 123. 
61 Paunio, 2012,  supra note 2, p. 189. 
62 De la Mare, T. and Donnelly, C. ‘Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal Integration: Evolution 
and Stasis’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law, 2. ed., Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011, p. 363. 
63 Ibid, p. 376. 
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preliminary ruling procedure is not strictly a bilateral arrangement, seeing as 
‘third party Member States, the Commission, and other interested parties’ often 
are involved in the proceedings before the CJEU in one way or the other.64 
Regardless of whether the preliminary ruling procedure gives rise to a dialogue 
or a discourse, it is clear that the context within which the CJEU operates is 
communicative. Additionally, as I do not look to limit the discussion of the 
communicativeness of the legal context the CJEU participates in to only revolve 
around the preliminary ruling procedure, there is no need to settle for only one 
term when framing this particular context. Rather, the aim is to show that this 
situation is part and parcel of the Court’s methodology, and thus an important 
component of the methodological framework.  
 To do this, as suggested above, I draw on Paunio’s thorough overview of the 
legal multilingual context that the CJEU is embedded in, which she has described 
with terms such as ‘a communicative situation’,65 ‘different communicative 
spheres’,66 or a ‘common cognitive basis among the EU legal community’.67 
While this inspiration is indeed important for the thesis, my approach to the 
communicative context is similar to the one adopted by Poiares Maduro in his 
analysis of the general rule on the free movement of goods, where he states: 
 
It is not, however, intended to develop here any such analysis of European 
legal discourse. The aim is simply to note how the existence of this legal 
discourse constrains the European Court of Justice and affects its case law 
[…]. Moreover, effective constraints do not simply flow from a discourse 
with national courts or other national institutions. They also arise from a 
discourse with the political and legislative actors of the [Union].68 
 
With that said, the point here is thus not to dive deep into the multilingual nature 
of Union law as Paunio has done in her impressive work. Instead, I look to 
proceed from her conclusion that the ‘pluralist EU framework […] divided into 
 
64 Ibid, p. 378. 
65 Paunio, 2012, supra note 2, p. 189. 
66 Ibid, p. 148. 
67 Ibid, p. 155 
68 Poiares Maduro, 1998, supra note 26, p. 31. 
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the EU audience and [27] national audiences, creating EU legal meaning which 
is accepted within both audiences requires that a communicative situation is 
established’.69 Hence, the Court’s work is influenced and constrained by this 
particular legal context and therefore I argue that it is clear that this 
communicative situation (in no small part created by virtue of the nature of the 
preliminary ruling procedure) should be viewed as an important component of 
the methodological framework of the CJEU. In order for it to promote 
acceptance and legitimacy for the Court, the methodological framework must 
include this specific legal context. This particular piece can be added to the 
illustration like follows: 
 
Seeing the methodological framework proposed in this thesis nearing its 
completion, we now turn to the final key component: legal principles of EU law.  
 
7. CJEU and the principles developed in the case law 
This section represents a somewhat paradoxical attempt to cover a subject that 
is not easily covered in a space as small as this section. It is, nonetheless, in my 
view, essential to make this attempt, seeing as the recognition of legal principles 
is vital for a theory that seeks to promote the understanding of the CJEU’s work. 
 
69 Paunio, 2012, supra note 2, p. 189. 
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Why is that then? Well, the creation of legal principles has been a remarkable 
feature of the CJEU in its history. It is indeed the ‘development of the general 
principles through the case law’ that has been the main contributor to the 
criticism under the label of ‘judicial activism’ directed at the Court.70 Before I 
proceed, some terminological remarks must be made.  
The topic of discussion in this section involves several different descriptive 
terms: ‘principles’, ‘legal principles’, ‘general principles’, ‘unwritten principles’, 
‘doctrines’, or simply ‘concepts’ or ‘notions’. Depending on your theoretical 
starting point, the direct effect of EU law, for instance, could be described either as 
a principle or a doctrine. Generally, the doctrine of direct effect seems to be preferred 
on occasions where the discussion is more linked to the nature of the EU legal 
order or something close thereto,71 while the principle of direct effect is used if the 
context regards more concrete statements on a particular point of law72 or if the 
discussion is directed at the fact that direct effect was constructed within the 
frame of developments in the CJEU’s case law.73 Here, it is this last outlook that 
is the most important one. In my view, regardless of whether the principles 
discussed below are framed in terms of legal principles, general principles, 
doctrines, etc., the common denominator between them is the fact that they 
were, at some point, framed within the Court’s case law.  
 An early warning may also be in order before the discussion of principles is 
continued. Below in section 10, I make a theoretical argument that consists of 
comparing primacy and direct effect with proportionality. I understand that this 
might appear perplexing to some readers, seeing as the direct effect and primacy 
of EU law remain unwritten principles to this day, having stayed left out of the 
Treaties for decades, while the principle of proportionality is an established piece 
of written law, which provides for a ‘rule’ or a ‘test’ that is applied in concrete 
cases. For now, however, I ask that you, reader, bear with me and keep an open 
 
70 Rosas, A. and Armati, L., EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction, 3rd edn., Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2018, pp. 42-43. 
71 See for instance, Schütze, 2018, supra note 32, p. 79 or De Witte, B., ‘Direct Effect, Primacy, 
and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in Craig, P. & de Búrca, G. (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 
2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 324. 
72 Rosas and Armati, 2018, supra note 70, p. 77. 
73 Lenaerts, K., ‘The Court’s Outer and Inner Selves: Exploring the External and Internal 
Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice’, in Adams, M. et al. (eds.), Judging Europe’s Judges: 
The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice, Hart, Oxford, 2013, p. 15. 
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mind as I lay down the foundations for the study of the argument that the value 
of proportionality can provide a counterweight, from the Member State perspective, 
against the Union perspective’s demands for direct effect and primacy. Suffice it 
to say here, however, that I argue that the mere fact that there are differences 
between the principles of direct effect and primacy, on the one hand, and the 
principle of proportionality, on the other hand, should not stand in the way of a 
comparative analysis of them. After all, they started out the same, as principles 
laid down in the case law, and the fact that one of them subsequently ‘found [its] 
way into the text of the Treaties’74 is, in my view, not enough to altogether 
preclude a comparative discussion of these concepts. 
 With that said, we turn to a brief discussion of the direct effect and primacy 
of EU law. The purpose here is not to describe the developments in the Court’s 
case law, starting with the seminal cases of Van Gend en Loos and Costa,75 which 
gave rise to the two principles. Instead, the idea is to highlight the point made 
by De Witte about the special nature of the doctrines of direct effect and 
primacy: 
 
Direct effect and primacy are not just frequently studied objects of Union 
law among others; these principles are also taken to be defining 
characteristics of EU law. Those doctrines are therefore accompanied by 
meta-doctrines about the overall nature of the European Union legal order.76 
 
It is upon this concept of meta-doctrines I wish to draw in the discussion below. 
Moreover, De Witte’s view on these principles as meta-doctrines is in my 
opinion closely linked to Tuori’s theoretical concept of background-principles77 of 
law. In his level-based system of law, Tuori clarifies that legal principles can, on 
the one hand, be seen as norms (or simply, ‘rules’) applied by courts but also, on 
the other hand, as background-principles which reconcile, explain and even give 
 
74 Rosas and Armati, 2018, supra note 70, p. 55. See also Schütze, 2018, supra note 32, p. 360. 
75 For a quick summary, see de Witte, 2011, supra note 71, pp. 324-329. 
76 Ibid, p. 324. Italics added. 
77 Tuori, K., ‘Om rättssäkerhet och sociala rättigheter (samt mycket annat), Tidskrift for 
rettsvitenskap, vol. 116, no. 3, 2003, p. 349. 
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rise to legal norms on the surface-level of law.78 At this point, however, critics 
may protest: ‘the principles of direct effect and primacy do not serve such a 
surface-level function!’. While I recognise the merit of this response, I maintain 
that this idea of viewing certain legal principles as meta-doctrines or background 
principles is of interest when the key components in the methodological 
framework are identified. 
 Seeing as both concepts – direct effect and primacy – were laid down in the 
Court’s case law, they do fit the notion of principles that is used in this section. 
As such, I thus argue that the understanding of these principles as meta-
doctrines, as put forward by De Witte, holds great merit. This dual view, that the 
principles give rise to rules on the surface-level as well as on the background- or 
meta-level, does hold true, in my view, at least for the development of these 
principles. When first established, the principle of direct effect, for example, was 
given form in the case law by a ‘test’ applied to the details of a case79 (the fact 
that the ‘facts of the case’ regarded legislative acts or other acts is irrelevant, in 
my view; the principle was still ‘applied’ on the surface-level). In the Union legal 
order of today, however, I accept that the principles of direct effect and primacy 
perhaps should be seen only as meta-doctrines of EU law, and that there is not really 
a case to be made for their nature as rules on the surface-level. Put differently, 
De Witte’s statement that the principles of direct effect and primacy are 
accompanied by meta-doctrines is perhaps not the best way to frame it. Instead, 
this ‘non-dual’ view of these doctrines seems to be supported by the fact that 
the CJEU, within the context of the preliminary ruling procedure, ‘sometimes 
‘forgets’ the assessment of the norm’s direct effect and proceeds immediately to 
the question of compatibility of national law with EU law’, if the referring court 
does not explicitly ask a ‘direct effect question’.80 I argue that this should be seen 
as evidence that the doctrine of direct effect mainly functions in background, 
and not on the surface-level. 
Turning back to the methodological framework, I argue that the perception 
of direct effect and primacy as meta-doctrines of Union law gives rise to 
 
78 Ibid, p. 349. 
79 Schütze, 2018, supra note 32, pp. 84-86. 
80 De Witte, 2011, supra note 71, p. 332. 
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methodological implications. If these principles are something else than rules to 
decide cases by on the surface-level, it is my view that their different quality 
means that they provide rules on the methodological level. Put differently, the 
meta-doctrines of Union law impose on the CJEU rules on how to decide cases (rather 
than the rules to decide cases by that are typically provided by legal principles). 
Interestingly, this conclusion gives a hint about an inherent issue in the 
‘development of general principles through case law’, which often has resulted 
in criticism against the Court.81 While I stand by the statement that certain 
principles (i.e. the meta-doctrines) give rise to rules on the methodological level, 
one can certainly see the problem in that the CJEU is making its own methodological 
rules through principles developed in the case law. Are the methodological standards not 
supposed to be based on the common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States? From this perspective, it seems understandable that the development of 
‘general’ or ‘unwritten’ principles through the Court’s case law on occasion has 
brought about ‘accusation[s] of judicial activism’.82  
At this stage, however, it is important to remember that the CJEU ‘has always 
sought inspiration in the legal systems of the Member States’ when laying down 
a general principle.83 Furthermore, the Court seeks to connect the general 
principles to the ‘legislative choices contained and expressed in the provisions 
[…] of EU law itself or from those reflected in the laws of the Member States, 
including instruments of international law to which they adhere’.84 In this sense, 
there is an argument for a certain degree of legitimacy embedded in these ‘judge-
made’85 principles. Again, however, it must be noted that this is not necessarily 
true for the principles of direct effect and primacy. As I see it, when the Court 
in Van Gend en Loos ‘cut the umbilical cord with classic international law by 
insisting that the European legal order was a ‘new legal order’’86 the argument 
that direct effect has a ‘national counterpart’ in the Member States’ constitutional 
 
81 Rosas and Armati, 2018, supra note 70, p. 42-43. 
82 Ibid. 43. 
83 Ibid, p. 56. 
84 Mazák, J. and Moser, M.K., ‘Adjudication by Reference to General Principles of EU Law: A 
Second Look at the Mangold Case Law’, in Adams, M. et al. (eds.), Judging Europe’s Judges: The 
Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice, Hart, Oxford, 2013, pp. 68-69. 
85 Ibid, p. 68. 
86 Schütze, 2018, supra note 32, p. 78. 
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traditions went out the window. The same goes for primacy, which ‘could not 
be derived from classic international law; and for that reason [the] Court had to 
declare the Union legal order autonomous from ordinary international law’ in 
Costa.87 Consequently, I argue that there is, to some extent, a lacking degree of 
legitimacy behind the meta-doctrines of direct effect and primacy (in general, 
this notion is in no way novel, seeing as, for instance, the differing views on the 
primacy of EU law in the ‘European perspective’ and the ‘national 
perspective(s)’ is a well-established fact88)  were they to be seen as components 
of the methodological framework proposed here. And this they will be, 
considering the impact they have (had) on Union law as well as the Court’s  
methodological approach.  
That last statement holds true for the meta-doctrines, specifically, as well as 
legal principles generally. In summary, then, legal principles laid down in the case 
law have come to play and important role in the way the CJEU carries out its 
task, and the meta-doctrines of direct effect and primacy provide rules not on the 
surface-level but rather on the methodological level (rules on how to decide 
cases, that is, and not rules to decide cases by). Accordingly, this viewpoint 
delivers the fourth and final piece to our methodological framework, which may 
now be illustrated in the following way:  
 
87 Ibid, p. 123. 




Legal principles as a concept is thus added as the fourth main component of the 
methodological framework of the CJEU, seeing as the construction of legal 
principles through the case law has provided the Court with an interesting way 
of influencing the European integration through developments of EU law. The 
sub-component of meta-doctrines is intended to show that certain principles, 
the doctrines of direct effect and primacy being the ones discussed above, have 
come to carry particular weight on the methodological level. As you may have 
noticed, this sub-component has not been entirely filled out in the framework’s 
regular grey base-colour. This is intended to be an indication of the doubts put 
forward above regarding the capacity of this sub-component to provide 
acceptance and legitimacy for the Court. Hence, in this illustration of the 
methodological framework, the idea is that the full grey rectangle represents a 
level of methodological performance that generally is sufficient to provide the 
Court with acceptance and legitimacy. With that said, the inadequacies of the 
sub-component of meta-doctrines are thus one among other topics of discussion 
in Part II. 
Before we turn to that discussion, however, a summary of the four main 
components in a methodological framework that seeks to provide the Court with 
acceptance and legitimacy may be needed. Following that summary, we turn in 
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Part II to the question of whether consequences are to be included in the 
framework sketched out here in Part I. 
 
8. Summary: a methodological framework of the CJEU 
As has been made clear in the foregoing, I propose a methodological framework 
of the CJEU which consists of four parts. To avoid attracting criticism on a 
methodological basis, the CJEU must seek to carry out its task within this 
framework and with respect to constraints posed by its four components. 
 First of all, from the fundamental call on the Court to provide reasons for its 
decisions follows that legal reasoning constitutes an integral part of the CJEU’s 
methodology. The Court’s model of reasoning is guided by the views on 
acceptable legal reasoning in the Member States. This has inspired a model of 
formal reasoning. It has been argued, however, that formal reasoning is not 
sufficient in a legal order where judicial discretion is present. In the exercise of 
this discretion the Court employs a model of teleological interpretation, which is 
focused on purposive interpretations. In its reasoning, the Court must succeed 
in justifying its decisions in the judgment of any given case. Furthermore, legal 
reasoning can be described as the ‘methodological voice’ in the methodological 
framework-theory. While the three remaining components may be distinguished 
from the legal reasoning, it is within the function of reasoning they are 
‘expressed’. That is what I mean when I state that the other components ‘inform 
the reasoning’. Still, it is my view that such a relationship between them does not 
preclude a separate examination of the four components.  
 Secondly, the CJEU has to bear in mind its previous case law. While there is no 
strict doctrine in Union law dictating that the Court must follow its previous 
decisions, that is in reality what the Court does more often than not. This is not 
only a consequence of the CJEU’s institutional and traditional position, but can 
also be understood against the fact that a somewhat firmer approach to 
precedent does provide for an overall coherence in the interpretation of Union law 
as well as increased legal certainty. What is more, building on the concept of so-
called interpretative precedents and their dual nature, I have proposed a sub-category 
of methodological precedents. These precedents demand a certain methodology when 
the application or interpretation of specific norm is carried out by the Court, 
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rather than simply a certain interpretation of a norm (which is the case with 
interpretative precedents in general). Hence, if there is an interpretative or 
methodological precedent of relevance to a case, the Court should decide in 
coherence with it to ensure that the judgment is well in accordance with the 
values of consistent interpretation and legal certainty.89  
 Thirdly, the Union legal context must be considered as a factor when 
constructing a theory about the methodology of the CJEU. With the preliminary 
ruling procedure as the main contributing factor, the Court finds itself in a 
communicative situation. While the preliminary ruling procedure set the stage for a 
situation of this nature, the communicativeness of it extends beyond this 
particular procedure. Effectively, the judgments and decisions of the Court – 
which ‘create legal meaning’ in the Union legal order – must be acceptable to 
both the EU audience and the Member State audiences. In my view, the CJEU’s 
participation in both a dialogue with national courts as well as a broader Union 
discourse clearly influences the manner in which the Court carries out its task, 
and the communicative situation is thus an important component of the 
methodological framework. 
 Fourthly, the development of legal principles through case law has provided 
the Court with, first, an opportunity to influence EU law as well as, secondly, 
certain methodological rules. While different terms are utilised when the concept 
of principles is discussed in the EU doctrine, the standpoint here has been that 
the common denominator for ‘principles’ in this context is that they have been 
developed in the case law of the CJEU. In relation to principles that give rise to 
rules on the methodological level, I have argued that this is the case regarding 
direct effect and primacy of EU law, which consequently have been described 
as meta-doctrines in the foregoing. As meta-doctrines, direct effect and primacy 
thus mainly function in the background, rather than as rules to decide cases by 
on the surface-level of EU law. Put differently, direct effect and primacy cannot 
 
89 In a situation where the Court wishes to depart from the rules laid down by previous case law, 
this should be regarded as a ‘methodological deficit’ within this component of the framework. 
To retain an acceptable level of methodological soundness, the Court needs to make up for the 
deficit within at least one other component. I expand on this notion of methodological deficit 
below, in section 10.2 and section 10.3. 
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really be viewed as rules which are applied to the facts of a case (anymore, I 
argue – in my view, they started out like this), but rather as meta-doctrines that 
influence the nature of EU law and, consequently, the methodology of the Court.  
 In creating legal principles through its case law, however, the Court has 
attracted criticism, often under the label of judicial activism. Much can be said 
about this –  and much has been said about this – so suffice it here to note that 
the fact that certain principles developed through case law have methodological 
implications can be viewed as an issue considering that the Court is expected to 
create its methodological standards with inspiration from the traditions of the 
Member States. In other words, one way of understanding the criticism is that 
the Court is creating its own rules by which it plays the methodological game. 
With that said, the Court usually finds guidance in the Treaties and the legal 
orders of the Member States when it lays down a principle in the case law. Yet, 
I have argued, that the meta-doctrines of direct effect and primacy cannot be 
viewed as a fully legitimate component of the methodological framework. In 
other words, this component is not completely consistent with the framework’s 
purpose of providing the Court with acceptance and legitimacy. Nonetheless, 
the meta-doctrines are included in the CJEU’s methodological framework, being 
a sub-component to the main component of legal principles, as the paramount 
influence of legal principles on EU law cannot be denied. I will revisit this issue 
in Part II.  
 With that said, we now leave the description of the four components of the 
methodological framework of the CJEU behind, as they have provided the 
foundation upon which Part II builds. Seeing as the identification of the key 
components in the framework has been finalised, the exploration of whether 















9. Why methodology matters – some reminding remarks  
Before turning to the discussion regarding the position of consequences in the 
methodological framework laid out in Part I, I will briefly highlight some of the 
underlying reasons behind the attempted construction of such a framework for 
the CJEU. In essence, this section attempts to provide a brief answer to the 
question of why we should care about methodology in the CJEU. 
 The first perspective on this question concerns the view that the Court needs 
to justify its judgments. Put differently, I thus argue that the CJEU requires a 
methodology capable of providing justification. Generally, the justification of a 
judgment depends on the reasoning provided by the Court. As suggested in 
section 4, however, formal reasoning – simply stating reasons, that is – does not 
suffice as the sole component of a process that seeks to ensure justification of 
the Court’s judgments. Reasoning of that superficial kind will not convince the 
various audiences in the Union legal context that the Court’s interpretation or 
decision in a particular case is justified. Furthermore, formal reasoning is based 
on the adjudication of clear cases, and not many cases before the CJEU are clear. 
As Bengoetxea, MacCormick, and Moral put it: 
 
The objection is then that the justification of clear cases has been adopted 
by the legal community and the dominant legal culture as the paradigm of 
judicial justification, and this to such an extent that […] there is no 
particularly strong pressure on judges to spell out how they have come to 
formulate the premises the way they have.90 
 
Instead, the demand for ‘acceptable reasons for the premises’91 beyond the 
formal reasoning of a judgment is valid. Put differently, the CJEU must justify 
the sub-decisions behind the major premises in its judgment.92 If this is done 
convincingly, the Court’s judgment can be considered internally justified.93 Yet, 
Bengoetxea et al. argues, such internal justification still is not enough. Rather, 
 
90 Bengoetxea et al., 2001, supra note 23, p. 50.  
91 Ibid. 




they also demand external justification, achieved through a ‘theory of coherence or 
integrity and notion of integration’ which allows for ‘taking account of all 
elements of the legal system, but also of normative constitutional and political 
theories’.94 In my view, this notion of external justification clearly goes hand in 
hand with the understanding of the Court as a participant in a communicative 
situation where it has to provide justification that makes its judgments acceptable 
to the different audiences in the Union legal context.  
It is along these lines of thought that I believe that an institutional approach 
is necessary. The notion of external justification calls for a perspective that takes 
into account the fact that the CJEU is embedded in one big system,95 and that the 
CJEU needs to be understood in this context rather than in isolation. Since the 
thesis seeks to construct a theory of a methodological framework to provide 
acceptance and legitimacy for the Court, it is important that the theoretical 
approach utilised here enables a perspective that provides for an understanding 
of the Court’s context. To summarise, the demand on the Court’s legal reasoning 
to provide external justification is best understood from a theoretical perspective 
that takes into account the broader social, economic and cultural context.96  
 Leaving reasoning and justification to one side, a second aspect to the 
question of why methodology matters shall be highlighted, namely the 
connection between the Court and the people. This point may appear somewhat 
detached from the discussion of methodology thus far, but it remains important, 
seeing as most Europeans grant high courts a lot of respect and ‘next to 
parliaments, more is expected from these courts than of any other political 
bodies’.97 Seen from this perspective, where the CJEU ‘acts as the conscience of 
the peoples of Europe’,98 there is a strong incentive to demand a genuine 
commitment to an adequate methodology from the Court’s side. Related to this 
‘democratic’ notion is the fact that the ‘EU ordinary policy making process (the 
 
94 Ibid, p. 63. 
95 Nielsen, 2013, supra note 18, p. 121. 
96 Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, 2013, supra note 16, p. 268. My translation. 
97 Schepel, H. and Blankenburg, E. ‘Mobilizing the European Court of Justice’, in de Búrca, G. 
and Weiler, J.H.H. (eds.), The European Court of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001,    
p. 11. 
98 Ibid, 10. 
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co-decision procedure) has many veto points, which makes it hard to overturn 
the determinations made by the judges’ of the CJEU.99 Needless to say, these 
determinations must be made on the basis of a sound methodology.  
 Briefly, I would also like to mention how the aspect of finality in judicial 
decision-making plays into the question of why sound methodology in the work 
of courts is needed. This idea ties into the point about the difficulty in 
overturning CJEU judges’ decisions. One could argue that the Court could 
change interpretations or lines of argumentation in future cases but as has been 
showed above, the CJEU rarely departs from previous case law. Furthermore, 
that sort of solution would not be of any help to the parties of a particular case 
in which the Court potentially makes a decision based on deficient methodology. 
Finality in this sense is thus a compelling argument in favour of demanding that 
the CJEU adheres to a sound methodological framework in its work as, on the 
one hand, the supreme interpreter of Union law and, on the other hand, a court 
of last resort. 
 With that said, we turn to the addressing the main issue of this Part II, namely 
the discussion of what position consequences hold in the methodological 
framework that has been presented in Part I. Furthermore, the components of 
the framework will thus be revisited and revised, either to be more specific or to 
appear more coherent with respect to the analysis carried out below. The idea 
behind revising the framework here in Part II compared to the way it was laid 
out in Part I has to do with the fact that, in this theory, the methodological 
framework’s ‘final design’ is intended to be forward-looking, in the sense that it 
seeks to provide acceptance and legitimacy for the Court as it continues to carry 
out its task in an ever-changing Union. The point of departure here is the notion 
provided by the FCC in PSPP. In that case, it can be recalled, the FCC found 
the CJEU’s judgment in Weiss to be methodologically insufficient in such an 
apparent manner that the Court’s decision was declared ultra vires in Germany. 
There are two reasons for taking this starting point. One is that the case can be 
utilised as an indicator of the importance of the issue of the acceptance and legitimacy 
of Court’s work (and thus an indicator of the importance of identifying a 
 
99 A Dyevre, 2013, supra note 21, p. 68. 
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methodological framework that can provide the Court with acceptance and 
legitimacy). The other is that PSPP will also be used as an example to illustrate some 
of the points made below. While the focus in PSPP was aimed at the inadequate 
– according to the FCC – application of the principle of proportionality, the 
following discussion in this Part II will take a broader approach, looking into 
what position consequences hold in the CJEU’s methodological framework as it 
has been presented here. 
 
10. Proportionality in methodology – purposes and consequences 
The following discussion is thus aimed at the potential inclusion of 
consequences in or among the components in the methodological framework 
sketched out in Part I. Before getting to the specifics of this section, however, 
some clarifying comments are in order.  
Below, I will make a connection between the two concepts ‘purpose’ and 
‘consequences’. This connection needs some explanation. In my view, analysing 
the purpose of a rule, for instance, requires that some cognitive effort is directed 
at the consequences that follow an application of the rule. The purpose of a rule 
should, as I see it, be understood against the consequences an application of the 
rule is supposed or expected to give rise to. In order for the rule to fulfil its purpose, 
certain consequences must occur. Here, my view relates to the concept of 
‘consequences as juridical implications’.100 I will, however, use an even broader 
view on the concept of consequences to also include ‘consequences as 
repercussions’.101 This expansive view on consequences is motivated by the 
institutional approach and the idea that the CJEU must be understood as a 
participant in the broader context it is embedded in. Thus, it is a dual 
understanding of consequences both as internal juridical implications and as 
external repercussions – relating to consequences in the ‘environment of the law, 
e.g. in the economy, or in other systems, even in the law as a social or legal 
field’102– that is employed here.  
 
100 Bengoetxea, J., The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European Jurisprudence, 
University Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 257. 
101 Ibid, p. 256. 
102 Ibid, p. 256-257. 
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This is my understanding of the relationship between purposes and 
consequences, and it builds into my understanding of the principle of 
proportionality, which will be put in a somewhat different light than usual. 
Actually, it would probably be for the best if I dropped the ‘principle’ from the 
‘proportionality’, here, in order to make it as clear as possible that this is not a 
discussion of the regular surface-level proportionality rule, but something different. 
With that said, the discussion does build on the typical design of this rule. Still, 
I will hereinafter speak of a doctrine of proportionality (compare the terminology of 
section 7) when the discussion is aimed at something beyond the conventional 
principle.  
 To me, the principle of proportionality is indeed an interesting way of, very 
concretely, expressing the power-relationship between the EU and the Member 
States: the Union legal order is allowed to interfere with the Member States’ legal 
orders, but only to an extent that can be deemed proportionate. A typical 
proportionality test, then, takes the purpose (aim) of an EU act and weighs this 
against the values of suitability and necessity.103 In my view, consequences 
constitute an essential factor in this analysis. How could you determine the 
suitability or necessity of an act without looking at the consequences of the act? 
Hence, the doctrine of proportionality works well as an umbrella concept that brings 
purpose and consequences – perhaps via ‘mediating factors’ such as suitability 
or necessity; although, to me, these are soft factors embedded in a method of 
analysing purpose (a fact, laid down in the legislative procedure, for instance) 
against consequences (facts, found by means of consequential analysis) – together 
in one analytical context. In short, in the doctrine of proportionality as it is 
proposed here, proportionality is a value fulfilled when a balance is struck 
between purpose and consequences. 
Now, purpose already has a clear role in the methodological framework of 
the CJEU, since the Court has adopted a teleological approach to interpretation 
within its legal reasoning. Yet, the Court has attracted criticism on a 
 
103 See for example Schütze, 2018, supra note 32, p. 361 and Amtenbrink, F., ‘The European 
Court of Justice’s Approach to Primacy and European Constitutionalism – Preserving the 
European Constitutional Order’, in Micklitz, H.W. and de Witte, B. (eds.), The European Court of 
Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States, Intersentia, Cambridge, 2012, p. 61. 
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methodological basis, and the following considerations thus pertain to the 
question of whether an inclusion of consequences in the methodological 
framework would allow the CJEU to escape such criticism. Would a 
methodological framework that includes consequential analysis be better at 
providing acceptance and legitimacy for the Court? Would that framework 
provide for proportionality in methodology?104 Let us see below. 
 
10.1. A transparent teleo-systemic model of reasoning 
Regardless of whether the Court feels the need to justify its judgments, I argue 
that it is clear that the audiences of the Union legal context expects it to do so. 
Here, I draw on the discussion of internal and external justification provided in 
section 9. To me, it is evident that the methodological framework must seek to 
provide both these forms of justification in order to best ensure the acceptance 
and legitimacy of the CJEU. Seeing as the matter of justification is innate to the 
Court’s legal reasoning, we now revisit this component of the framework, with 
the concept of consequences, or consequential analysis, in mind. 
It is clear that the CJEU relies heavily on teleological argumentation (as 
opposed to linguistic arguments) in its reasoning, often referring to terms like the 
‘rationale’, ‘aim and spirit’, or ‘meaning and purpose’ of a norm.105 Sometimes, 
however, the Court utilises systemic argumentation which takes the ‘general 
scheme’ and ‘legal context’ of a norm into account.106 Between teleological and 
systemic argumentation there is a considerable overlap, and within this category 
of teleo-systemic criteria, Beck puts consequentialist criteria.107 Consequentialist 
arguments can relate to either ‘social, political or economic consequences that 
might flow from judicial decisions’ or ‘juridical consequences of a judicial 
decision within the legal order’.108 Seeing as the Court is not unwilling to adopt 
a teleo-systemic approach in which consequential arguments may be considered 
 
104 Here, I thus refer to proportionality as the value of a balance between purpose and 
consequences, as suggested above. 
105 Beck, 2012, supra note 14, p. 285–287. 
106 Ibid, p. 289. 
107 Ibid, pp. 212–213. 
108 Ibid, p. 212. Compare the line of reasoning above regarding consequences as external 
repercussions and internal juridical implications above in this section. 
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(it has been argued that the well-known cases of Defrenne and Van Gend en Loos109 
as well as Costa110 provide good examples of this sort of reasoning), it may be 
concluded that consequences indeed seem to have their rightful place in the legal 
reasoning of the CJEU. 
 There are, however, advantages with the current teleological approach in the 
Court’s reasoning. According to Paunio, teleological reasoning ‘may enhance 
predictable argumentation and the substantive form of legal certainty in that it 
openly expresses the aims and objectives’ that a specific interpretation of a given 
norm has been based on.111 Still, this requires a clear ‘linkage’ between the 
purposes and the norms in question as to avoid a loss of transparency in the 
reasoning.112 In my view, the legal certainty would only be further promoted if 
the teleological reasoning became even more transparent by not only moving 
away from the ‘meta-purposes’,113 but also by including the consequences of a 
certain interpretation or application of a norm. By way of this, the model of 
reasoning would indeed become transparently teleo-systemic, openly expressing 
the purposes as well as the consequences in the reasoning, not leaving them to 
merely be ‘behind the curtain’-considerations. 
 Critically, ‘all judgments have consequences’, and they may be of different 
types and sometimes unforeseen.114 Still, as has been suggested in the foregoing,  
not all judgments ‘incorporate into their reasoning and motivation an analysis of 
the consequences of deciding one way or the other’.115 Crucially, though:  
 
This [incorporation of consequences in some cases] does not mean that 
only those judgments have been made or decided on the basis of their 
 
109 Ibid, pp. 212–213. 
110 Lenaerts, K. and Gutiérrez-Fons, J.A, ‘To Say What the Law of the EU is: Methods of 
Interpretation and the European Court of Justice, EUI Working Paper AEL, 2013/9, 2013,           
p. 25. 
111 Paunio, 2012, supra note 2, pp. 81–82. 
112 Ibid, p. 82. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Bengoetxea, J., ‘Reasoning from Consequences from Luxembourg’, in Koch, H. et al. (eds.), 
Europe: The New Legal Realism : Essays in Honour of Hjalte Rasmussen, Djøf Publishing, København, 




consequences, but rather, that in that particular case, the Court considered 
reasoning from consequences as an acceptable form of public justification.116 
 
Put differently, since the Court is not averse to the idea of taking consequences 
into account in its reasoning to justify its decision-making, I argue that there is 
merit to the idea of including consequential reasoning in the methodological 
framework of the CJEU.  
 While I do argue that a transparent teleo-systemic model is the most suitable 
model of reasoning in a methodological framework that seeks to provide 
acceptance and legitimacy for the Court, there are explanations to why this sort 
of reasoning is not always visible in the judgments. Indeed, there must be some 
rationale behind the fact that the ‘Court reason from consequences in many 
more instances than it explicitly brings to light’117. In short, one answer could be 
that the Court wants to avoid the ‘difficult terrain’, that might be ‘too technical 
or too political’, which may appear if the Court’s reasoning is clearly based on 
consequences rather than strictly law.118 Another interesting answer relates to the 
CJEU’s position in ‘separation of powers issues’, and when the Court analyses 
the consequences of a decision in such a case it indeed needs to ‘think as an 
interstitial legislator’.119 The problem is, however, that the CJEU ‘lacks the 
legitimacy and know-how of the legislator’ and it will therefore be keen to give 
the impression that the decision was reached by considering the ‘aims, objectives 
and effectiveness of the pre-existing norms’.120 Putting issues of this kind to one 
side, the CJEU still is the supreme interpreter of the Treaties, which ‘places a 
special burden on the Court to justify its decisions’ and providing reasons for 
those decisions is the ‘essence of justification.121 Once again we return to the 
importance of transparency and Bengoetxea summarises it proficiently: 
 
 
116 Ibid, pp. 41–42. Italics added. 
117 Ibid, p. 53. 
118 Ibid, p. 46. 
119 Ibid, p. 54. 
120 Ibid, pp. 54–55. 
121 Ibid, p. 55. 
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The citizens, the litigants, the legal system, the jurists, the stakeholders, all 
the audiences need to know the reasons that support any given 
interpretation of the law because the law is not the Court’s dominion; the 
law is the emanation of the will of the demos, the demoi and this requires 
participative and deliberative rationality and democracy. The Court needs 
to follow a balanced approach in declaring its meaning because it is the 
institution that has been entrusted […] with the power of authoritative, 
official interpretation. Such a power is to be exercised publicly, with 
transparency and rationality […].122 
 
This conclusion clearly pertains to the notion that the Court has audiences to 
convince – and much more so than national courts, I might add, as they exist in 
a much more straight-forward (read, perhaps, ‘non-pluralistic’) legal context than 
the CJEU – by adopting a rational and transparent methodology.  
To summarise, I argue that a transparent teleo-systematic approach should 
be the principal model of legal reasoning in the methodological framework, and 
that this sort of reasoning would enable the Court to carry out its task with 
acceptance and legitimacy in the legal context it finds itself embedded in.  
 
10.2. The place of consequences in the methodological framework, using PSPP as an example 
It has been argued above that a transparent teleo-systematic approach would be 
an appropriate model of legal reasoning for the CJEU. Currently, however, the 
Court’s approach still is essentially focused to a teleological model which more 
often than not conceals decisions and motives behind the formal reasoning 
displayed in the judgments. With those remarks about the Court’s legal reasoning 
in mind, I now continue the discussion of whether a methodological framework 
that includes consequences or consequential analysis is better suited for the task 
of providing the Court with acceptance and legitimacy with regard to the other 
components. At this point, I will utilise PSPP to exemplify the points made 
below, in an attempt to reduce the abstraction of the discussion.  
 
122 Ibid, p. 56. 
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 As has been suggested in the foregoing, it is in no small part the particular 
legal context of the Union that makes the demand for sound methodology in 
the Court so relevant. In this context, the CJEU and the national courts 
participate in a ‘game of coexistence’ where they ‘trade issues depending on the 
importance they attach to them’.123 Dyevre has described the communication in 
this ‘game’ with the term ‘judicial signalling’, and concludes that such signalling 
from the national courts ‘in the form of threats to disapply EU acts is thus shown 
to be an effective way to extract concessions from the [CJEU] while avoiding an 
escalated judicial war’.124 Viewed from this perspective, the PSPP can be 
understood as a signal from the FCC to the Court to step up its methodological 
game, and if that does not happen, EU acts will continue to run the risk of being 
declared ultra vires in Germany. Put differently, in this game of coexistence, which 
is being played in the arena of the communicative situation of the Union legal context, 
the FCC has demanded that the Court must take account of consequences, in 
this case by means of the proportionality principle, with a more compelling 
methodology. In essence, it is my view that the Court has received a judicial 
signal from a domestic court which constitutes a call – for a methodologically 
stronger approach to consequences – that cannot be taken lightly. This point 
gets even more interesting if one considers that it is the FCC that is the ‘signalling 
court’, seeing as ‘few [other] domestic high courts can make a credible claim to 
superpower status’.125 Perceiving PSPP as a signal or a threat from the FCC to 
the CJEU in this game of coexistence thus makes for a good argument in favour 
of a methodological framework which promotes the presence of consequences 
in the reasoning of the Court’s judgments.  
 Moreover, taking the judicial signalling from national high courts seriously 
can also be considered necessary against the fact that ‘Union law does not have 
the legal instruments needed to cope with extreme cases of disagreement’.126 The 
resolution of constitutional conflicts instead relies on the willingness of the 
 
123 Dyevre, 2013, supra note 21, p. 71. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid, p. 70. 
126 Baquero Cruz, J., ‘Legal Pluralism and Institutional Disobedience’ in Avbelj, M. and Komarék, 
J. (eds.), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, Hart, Oxford, 2012, p. 254. 
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‘guardians of those constitutional orders […] to engage in a productive dialogue 
with the institutions of integration’.127 Would the CJEU fail to modify its 
methodology in the direction of what the FCC demanded in PSPP, it runs the 
risk of pushing the FCC into actions of ‘institutional disobedience’.128 If it not 
already has, that is. It is indeed interesting to consider if the PSPP could be 
framed in terms of institutional disobedience. Baquero Cruz argues: 
 
What national constitutional courts or courts that carry out constitutional 
review are doing when they voice actual or potential reservations to the 
absolute supremacy of European Union law is, in my view, closer to an 
attempt at institutional disobedience than it is to a defence of state-centered 
constitutionalism or to a virtuous open-ended pluralistic dialogue. […] 
These institutions seem to be saying: if there is a higher principle in danger we 
may want to reserve ourselves the possibility of disobeying Union law.129 
 
This is an interesting view on the relationship between national courts and the 
CJEU, and with this notion alongside the considerations above – pertaining to 
‘judicial war’, ‘threats’, and the ‘game of coexistence’ – I feel compelled to 
reframe the terms of the EU legal context, namely by describing it in in terms of 
a pugnacious communicative situation. In short, the communicative situation can be 
described as pugnacious since its participants play a game of high stakes, stakes 
related to the survival of the Union legal order. In this game the participants may 
threaten each other in order to defend either their status or certain legal 
prospects that they have an interest in preserving or protecting. Returning to 
Baquero Cruz, it is stimulating to reference his normative framework on 
institutional disobedience in the context of PSPP. According to him, four phases 
or criteria must be fulfilled when determining whether the actions of a national 
institution (like a court) constitute institutional disobedience, and these relate to: 
1) a higher principle is endangered, 2) other procedures will not suffice, 3) pros 
and cons must be weighed and 4) the disobedience must be carried out openly.130 
 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid, p. 265. 
129 Ibid. Italics added. 
130 Ibid, pp. 266–267. 
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 First, the FCC’s demand for a higher quality of methodology is linked to the 
principle of proportionality. Seeing as this principle is ‘common to the systems 
concerned’ and ‘not peculiar to the legal order’,131 it fits Baquero Cruz’ 
framework. Second, the FCC has utilised the preliminary ruling procedure, 
meaning that PSPP is not the first and only resort.132 Third, the FCC must have 
carefully considered the pros and cons of its action, and also be ‘ready to accept 
all the political and legal consequences of its disobedience’.133 On this point I 
would like to express the opinion that the proportionality principle carries so 
much importance to the Member States that if the CJEU would consistently fail 
to properly apply or interpret it in its judicial decision-making, most Member 
States would be ready to take radical action to protest such behaviour. In a 
European Union where its law is forced upon the national legal orders with both 
direct effect and primacy, the Member States can be expected to have a 
fundamental demand that this ‘intrusion’ is carried out with a certain level 
flexibility or reasonability (or suitability or necessity, if you will!) – with 
proportionality. Now, when one implies, to any extent, that the Member States 
‘do not want direct effect and primacy’ the response is often ‘then why have they 
not put an end to it through the Treaties?’. Here, I thus submit that the value of 
proportionality is one (perhaps among others) reservation that makes the 
Member States accept the intrusion of EU law in their domestic legal orders. 
That being said, I thus argue that the FCC was fully knowing and accepting of 
the consequences of the stance it took in PSPP. Fourth, the decision in PSPP 
fulfils the criteria of being performed ‘publicly and explicitly’134 seeing as the 
FCC was very clear on the reasons for rejecting the Court’s decision in Weiss.135 
From this perspective, PSPP could not be seen as ‘sheer silent ignorance of 
Union law [which] would never qualify as institutional disobedience’.136 With 
regard to the foregoing, there is a case for placing PSPP within Baquero Cruz’ 
normative framework on institutional disobedience. 
 
131 Ibid, p. 266. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid, p. 267. 
135 PSPP, supra note 4, see for example paras 142 and 163. 
136 Baquero Cruz, 2012, supra note 126, p. 267. 
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 The point here is not, however, to get too theoretical regarding the acts of 
the FCC in the context of cases Weiss and PSPP – the intention is not to review 
the legality of the criticism put forward by the FCC. Rather, it is to show that in 
the context of the pugnacious communicative situation, within which the CJEU 
and high domestic courts like the FCC interact, the CJEU should not take the 
FCC’s judicial signal, calling for methodological soundness, lightly. The result 
being that the judgment was declared ultra vires is highly undesirable from the 
EU perspective. Critics, however, might say that this was all it was; a call for a 
more sound application of the surface-level proportionality test, and not a call 
for proportionality as a ‘value of methodology’ nor a call for an inclusion of 
consequences in a methodological framework within which the Court should 
operate. Some might argue that it was only a coincidence that the FCC in PSPP 
attacked the methodology with which Court in Weiss applied the proportionality 
principle. In response to this, I maintain that there have been grunts about the 
CJEU’s ‘methodological shortcomings’137 for some time, and that it was only 
when the value of proportionality was on the line that a judgment like PSPP was 
handed down by the FCC. This view relates to the Baquero Cruz’ point about 
‘higher principles at stake’ referred to above. Additionally, an analogy with the 
original Solange-doctrine138 can be made; it was when something as important as 
fundamental rights was on the line that the FCC felt the need to take radical 
action against the Court. From this perspective, I argue that proportionality of EU 
acts can be seen as value that seems to lie equally close to the hearts of the Member 
States (of Germany, anyway) as fundamental rights do. In my opinion, the 
complaints voiced in PSPP provides for a good argument in favour of the view 
that a methodological framework that openly takes consequences into account 
is better suited to provide the CJEU’s judgments with acceptance in the Union 
legal context than a methodological framework that leaves consequences out of 
transparent consideration. 
Furthermore, the FCC concludes that ‘completely disregarding the economic 
policy effects of the PSPP contradicts the methodological approach taken by the 
 
137 Mazák, 2013, supra note 84, p. 61. 
138 For a brief overview, see Schütze, 2018, supra note 32, pp. 132-133. 
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CJEU in virtually all other areas of EU law’.139 This argument can be understood 
in the context of methodological precedents that was proposed above in section 
5. The FCC essentially argues that by taking consequences into account when 
deciding cases regarding fundamental rights, indirect discrimination, measures 
of equivalent effect, the principle of effectiveness, the principle of equivalence,140 
and ‘even in relation to provisions allocating competences’,141 the CJEU has 
established a significant body of methodological precedents which require the 
involvement of consequences in the Court’s methodological approach. From 
this perspective, it is understandable that the FCC expected ‘further reasons to 
justify [the] different approach’142 that was employed by the Court in Weiss. This 
brings me to an interesting analytical topic pertaining to the methodological 
framework laid out in Part I, namely the notion of methodological deficit. Before I 
expand on this, let us revisit the framework illustration, which now can be 
revised to mirror some of the suggestions made so far here in Part II:  
 
As we can see, the sub-component of teleological interpretation of the CJEU’s 
legal reasoning has been replaced by the concept of a transparent teleo-systematic 
 
139 PSPP, supra note 4, para 146. 
140 Ibid, paras 147–151. 
141 Ibid, para 152. 
142 Ibid, para 153. 
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approach, which I have argued should be the dominant model of reasoning for 
the Court. Furthermore, the Union legal context has been specified to be 
characterised by the pugnacious communicative situation the Court participates in. 
Additionally, the framework now includes both interpretative and methodological 
precedents as a sub-component to the Court’s approach to recognising previous 
case law. There is no reason to remove the overriding category of interpretative 
precedents as this type of previous case law still functions, in general, on a 
methodological level. Put differently, it is clear, from a general methodological 
perspective, that the Court has to recognise the interpretative precedents of its 
previous case law. This has to do with the value of promoting coherence and 
legal certainty in EU law. In certain cases, though, the Court might have to bear 
specific methodological precedents in mind. Hence, the broad category of 
interpretative precedents imposes a methodological rule on the Court, while the 
sub-category of methodological precedents serves as a way of understanding 
specific situations, like Weiss/PSPP, for instance. In this particular case, the 
general rule of interpretative precedents helps us understand that the Court is 
expected to follow its previous case law. The notion of methodological 
precedents, however, helps us understand why the FCC, in PSPP, expresses 
concern about the specific approach to consequences the Court took in Weiss. 
Thus far, reader, you may have noticed, that the last piece of the framework – 
consisting of legal principles – has not yet been amended. I will return to this 
component after a brief discussion of methodological deficit, a concept which is 
best introduced in this context. 
 What I mean by ‘methodological deficit’ here is a decrease in quality of the 
acts or the performance of the Court with regard to a given component in the 
methodological framework proposed in this thesis. On this point, the cases of 
PSPP and Weiss once again provide good examples. As noted above, the FCC 
took the stance that the CJEU should have provided a more comprehensive 
reasoning concerning the fact that the usual methodology with which the 
principle of proportionality is interpreted and applied was disregarded.143 From 





from its previous case law and, since it does not typically do that, the quality of 
the methodology decreased. Hereby, the judgment suffered a methodological 
deficit within the ‘recognition of precedent’-component. Interestingly, though, 
this deficit may be remedied by a methodological ‘boost’ in another component 
of the framework. In essence, the Court, in a specific case, can make up for a 
deficit within one component by enhancing the quality (or perhaps quantity144) 
of the performance within another. Perhaps it is here where the methodological 
framework sketched out in this thesis lends the biggest help to the understanding 
of how the Court can ensure the acceptance and legitimacy of its judgments. 
Moreover, it should be remarked that the CJEU may utilise all four components 
of the framework to maintain an acceptable level of methodological 
performance as it carries out the task conferred upon it by the Member States.  
For example, if the Court is in a situation where it wishes to depart from 
previous case law – which is within its right, as it is not formally bound by precedent 
– it has to provide further explanation as to why this is the decision it makes. 
This, as explained in the foregoing, has to do with the value of coherence or 
‘consistency’, and it is indeed as Snell puts it: 
 
Similar cases have to be decided in the same way. There must be no 
arbitrary decisions. If there are rulings that do look inconsistent, the 
reasoning must convincingly distinguish the situations.145  
 
The obvious way of providing further explanation is thus by increasing the 
quality and/or quantity of the reasoning, by providing stronger and/or several 
arguments in favour of its decision. Another way could of course be to rely on 
an important principle of EU law, seeing as legal principles carry great weight in 
the Union legal order.146 Essentially, however, the demand for increase in other 
 
144 For example: on the one hand, the quality of reasoning may increase within that component 
while, on the other hand, the quantity of previous cases cited in favour of the Courts decision or 
interpretation can increase within that component. 
145 Snell, J., ‘The Legitimacy of Free Movement Case Law’, in Adams, M. et al. (eds.), Judging 
Europe’s Judges: The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice, Hart, Oxford, 2013,     
p. 114. 
146 Again, while the reliance on an important principle of Union law is of course expressed in the 
legal reasoning, I argue that there is merit to the distinction between the four components of the 
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components stems from the legal context and the communicative situation the CJEU 
finds itself in – which means that increases in other categories seek to generate 
an increase in the acceptability of the Court’s performance to the audiences it 
communicates with. In my view, this example has not only illustrated the idea of 
methodological deficit but also highlighted the indisputable interconnectedness 
between the four components in the methodological framework. Additionally, 
it might be of furhter explanatory interest to provide a brief ‘opposite example’. 
If the Court can cite a long row of previous cases that points in the same 
direction as the Court’s view in a given case, it need not dwell on providing a 
thick body of legal reasoning in favour of its decision. The acceptable level of 
justification may already be reached. Section 10.3 provides further illustration of 
the concept of methodological deficit by means of an application of the 
methodological framework-sketch to this particular notion. 
With that being said, we return to the legal principles of Union law and their 
place in the framework sketched out in this thesis. In section 7 above, the direct 
effect and primacy of Union law were discussed as separate principles, but it has 
been argued that they should be seen as ‘legal concepts […] fostering the 
obedience of the Member States’, i.e. as concepts ensuring the effectiveness of EU 
law.147 This principle of effectiveness does not only consist of the direct effect 
and primacy of Union law, however. Rather, the principle ‘comprises all judicially 
developed concepts conveying effectiveness to [Union] law in the Member 
States’ legal orders; these in turn constitute important norms and thus 
principles.148 In addition to direct effect and primacy, these concepts relate inter 
alia to the autonomy of Union law, effective and uniform application by Member 
State authorities and the concept of state liability under Union law.149 
There is good reason for a replacement of the discussion of direct effect and 
primacy with a broader discussion of effectiveness for the purposes of this 
 
framework being upheld. Some might say that a principle-based argument is just another argument, 
belonging to the component of legal reasoning, but I maintain that such a perspective would fail, 
on the one hand, to recognise the importance of legal principles in EU law and, on the other 
hand, to portray a nuanced and all-catching methodological framework of the Court. 
147 Bogdandy, A. von, ‘Founding Principles’, in Bogdandy, A. von and Bast, J. (eds.), Principles of 
European Constitutional Law, 2nd edn., Hart, Oxford, 2010, p. 29. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid, pp. 29-30. 
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thesis. Indeed, it has been suggested that the CJEU has made the principles of 
direct effect and primacy part of a ‘bolder and more ambitious notion of 
effectiveness’150. In my view, the sometimes almost notorious focus on the 
principles of direct effect and primacy of Union law is thus better directed at the 
‘overarching principle of effectiveness’151 in a study of methodology in EU law, 
such as this one. Here, within the context of proposing a methodological 
framework of the CJEU, the extensive discussions that may be sparked upon the 
encounter with the concepts of direct effect and primacy are not of interest. 
Rather, I rely on the fact that this notion of effectiveness constitutes a principle 
which undeniably has had a paramount influence on the development of the 
Union legal order. As such, it does represent a meta-doctrine which is a 
component of the Court’s methodological framework. To reiterate the point 
made in section 7 about meta-doctrines, the principle of effectiveness thus does 
not function on the surface-level as a rule to decide a case by but rather as a rule 
on the methodological level that governs the overall manner in which the CJEU 
goes about deciding a case. 
As I have tried to illustrate above, consequences have a role to play in the 
different components of the methodological framework. On the back of those 
considerations and arguments, I assert that the understanding of the doctrine of 
proportionality as a way of promoting the value of balancing purposes against 
consequences, carry great weight on the methodological level. While it indeed 
may appear controversial to conclude that proportionality should be included 
alongside the effectiveness of EU law in a methodological framework of the 
CJEU, I maintain that it is interesting to view proportionality as a counterweight 
from the Member State perspective to the Union perspective’s demand of 
effectiveness. While this view on the doctrine of proportionality as a broader concept 
has been presented as controversial, there is some support in the EU legal 
research. Certain authors have provided similar views, and two of them will be 
looked at briefly. 
 
150 Weatherill, S., Law and Integration in the European Union, Clarendon P., Oxford, 1995, p. 117. 
151 Ibid, p. 116. 
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First, Davies puts forward an interesting perspective, proposing that ‘there 
must be a system ensuring that EU law does not cause unnecessary destructive 
effects on national policy, and […] a system ensuring that national concerns as 
well as European interests are voiced and articulated in the decision-making 
process, so that it is apparent why judicial decisions go the way they do’.152 
Furthermore, he asserts that Union legislation ‘will often have unintended 
consequences’ and that therefore is a need for a principle ‘which addresses the 
situation where EU law has unusually destructive or chaotic effects, and balances 
the interests involved’153 before arguing that: 
 
Such a balancing belongs naturally within proportionality, and as such is already 
part of EU law. Asking whether the application of that law is in fact 
disproportionate, because it has particularly dramatic or harmful 
consequences, is not doctrinally new. However, in the application of 
proportionality national autonomy and the national capacity to formulate 
and carry out policy is rarely seen as a value in itself. […] The application 
of this would take place in the context of the preliminary ruling procedure. 
[…] The ambiguous and slippery nature of the division of powers in the 
reference procedure means that both national and European courts have 
an important role. Neither is emasculated, and it is the interest of each to 
formulate their concerns and the relevant interests at their level in the most 
clear and complete way.154 
 
While Davies admits that it is a ‘dangerous proposal’, seeing as it would 
sometimes result in the failure of substantive EU law ‘in some contexts’, he 
reiterates that ‘the interests involved at national level are real and ignoring them 
would be politically untenable as well as an undemocratic option’.155 To me, this 
is indeed a sentiment to the relevance of proportionality as a process of balancing 
interests as well as evidence of the value of proportionality in the communicative 
situation the CJEU participates in. 
 
152 Davies, G., ‘Constitutional Disagreement in Europe’, in Avbelj, M. and Komarék, J. (eds.), 
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, Hart, Oxford, 2012, p. 280. 
153 Ibid, italics added. 
154 Ibid, p. 281, italics added. 
155 Ibid, p. 282. 
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Secondly, Bobek has, in his discussion of ‘procedural autonomy of the 
Member States’156 concluded that, in the Court’s case law: 
 
Van Schijndel was hailed as the introduction of the ‘procedural rule of 
reason’, which would allow of institutionalised balancing between the 
interests of the [Union] and the procedural interests of the Member States. 
The balancing would involve a type of proportionality argument, which would 
institutionalise the balancing of the need for effective application of 
[Union] law on the national level on the hand and various legitimate 
Member States’ interest on the other.157 
 
Subsequently, however, the Court has, to Bobek’s disappointment, refrained 
from using and developing the ‘‘balancing’ or ‘proportionality’ test’ from Van 
Schijndel and instead utilises an internally contradictive ‘I-know-it-when-I-see-it’ 
test of effectiveness. Still, his view on proportionality as a ‘reasonable balance 
[that] is struck between (recognised and identified) legitimate interests of the 
European Union on the one hand and those of the Member State(s) on the 
other’,158 is indeed interesting and certainly closely linked to the view I have 
expressed here.  
Therefore, in this methodological framework – being a theoretical tool for 
understanding how the CJEU should work to ensure the acceptance and 
legitimacy of its judgments – the meta-doctrine of proportionality is included 
alongside the meta-doctrine of effectiveness. These considerations mean that the 
final component, legal principles, is now revised in the following way: 
 
156 Bobek, M., ‘Why There is No Principle of ‘Procedural Autonomy’ of the Member States’, in 
Micklitz, H.W. and de Witte, B. (eds.), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member 
States, Intersentia, Cambridge, 2012, p. 305. 
157 Ibid, p. 310, italics added. 




The addition of proportionality as a counterweight to the effectiveness of EU 
law thus makes the sub-component completely filled out in the grey base-colour, 
indicating my view that the methodological framework, in this design, can 
provide the Court with a methodology that ensures the acceptance and 
legitimacy of its judgments. 
As suggested by the title of this thesis, I argue that the importance of the 
value of proportionality – promoting balance between the purposes of effective 
EU law and the consequences it has on national legal orders – to the Member 
States, means that the notion of proportionality in methodology is not completely 
unfounded. As an example, PSPP illustrated that the Court’s (alleged) manifest 
failure to take consequences into account pushed the FCC into extreme action 
– whether you call it judicial signalling or institutional disobedience – as it 
declared the CJEU’s decision ultra vires in Germany. This thesis has been fairly 
theoretical in most part, but it does indeed explore a rather practical problem of 
EU law, namely the issue of persuading the Member States (and their courts!) to 
comply with the decisions of the CJEU. In this sense, proportionality is indeed 
an important value from the EU perspective as well, as it, in my view, enables 
such compliance. Before turning to some summarising comments in the final 




10.3. Methodological deficit 
Here, I will provide further illustration of the concept of ‘methodological deficit’ 
that was touched on in section 10.2, by utilising the methodological framework-
sketch. This illustration is based on the example provided by the situation where 
the Court wishes to depart from an interpretation or application laid down in its 
previous case law. The deficit within the previous case law-component could 
then be illustrated like this:  
 
 
The way the framework-sketch is meant to be understood in this context is thus 
that the whole rectangle represents a level of methodological performance that 
is acceptable to the audiences that the Court needs to convince. Put differently, 
if the Court only reaches a performance level equivalent to the one illustrated 
above in a given case, the decisions or interpretations of a judgment may be 
deemed methodologically insufficient by, for instance, a domestic constitutional 
court such as the FCC. To avoid an outcome of that kind, the Court can attempt 
to generate a methodological boost in another component, just as suggested in 
section 10.2.  
 For example, the Court might then improve the quality of the legal reasoning 
in this particular case. Whether it provides stronger arguments or perhaps just 
more arguments, the methodological performance within the component of 
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The idea is thus to illustrate that when the Court provides further reasons to 
explain why it departs from previous case law, the methodological boost in the 
component of legal reasoning is enough to ‘fill the gap’ that appeared in the 
previous case law-component after the methodological deficit illustrated in the 
first picture in the appendix. By virtue of this boost, the deficit has been 
eliminated and an acceptable level of methodological performance is maintained.  
 Lastly, I would like to point out that, had this thesis been the type of work 
that would have allowed for a more extensive study of the CJEU’s case law, it 
would have been interesting to ‘apply’ the methodological framework proposed 
here to samples of said case law. In such a study, it would have been curious to 
see whether the idea of methodological deficit is merited by the actual work of 
the Court. With that being said, it can be concluded, that the methodological 
framework and the notion of methodological deficit, in my view, indeed offers 




11. Summary: a proposed framework, proportionality in methodology, 
and a concept of methodological deficit 
Employing an institutional approach to law, this thesis has conducted a study of 
the features of EU law that pertain to the methodology of the CJEU. These 
features have been described within the context of four key components of a 
methodological framework. Since the theoretical approach employed here allows for 
an understanding of the Court as an institution that is embedded in a broader 
legal and political context, this study reaches further than, for instance, a strict 
legal analysis of the legal reasoning of the Court. To be sure, the legal reasoning 
plays a big part in the discussion of the CJEU’s methodology, but if the external 
context of the Union legal order can be considered, and thereby the communicative 
situation the Court participates in, the methodological framework as a theory 
about the CJEU becomes far more comprehensive. In my view, these two 
components are the most important in the methodological framework, in the 
design it has been given in this thesis. This has to do with the fact that the two 
other components, namely recognition of precedent and legal principles, could be argued 
to belong in the component of legal reasoning. In other words, I recognise that 
the distinction is harder to uphold here, between these two components and 
reasoning, than it is between reasoning and legal context. Be that as it may, it is 
my view that the components pertaining to recognition of precedent and legal 
principles are more than merely ‘arguments from precedent’ and ‘arguments 
from principles’. I maintain, which has been made clear in the foregoing, that 
they serve a stronger methodological purpose than types of arguments, and that is 
the reason why they have been included as specific components of the 
methodological framework design. 
 As the framework ‘puzzle’ was completed in Part I, the foundation for the 
discussion in Part II had been established. On the basis of the four components, 
I argued that there is indeed a place in the methodological framework for 
consequences or consequential analysis, and therewith, the meta-doctrine of 
proportionality. In my view, the inclusion is motivated by the importance of the 
value of proportionality to the Member States, and thereby their compliance with 
the Court’s decisions. In PSPP, the FCC reacted strongly against the Court’s 
seeming disregard of the consequences of an ECB programme in the case Weiss, 
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and took issue with the methodology in the case. Whether PSPP should be 
regarded as judicial signalling, a threat to disapply Union law, or as institutional 
disobedience may not be conclusive, but it is clear that the CJEU should take 
the call for a more convincing methodology seriously, so as not to undermine 
the stability of Union legal order by means of a diminishing degree of compliance 
from certain or several Member States. In short, I have argued that 
proportionality provides a counterweight to the demand of effectiveness of 
Union law, and that it therefore should be considered as a component of a 
methodological framework that seeks to provide the Court with acceptance and 
legitimacy in the EU legal context. 
 Finally, the methodological framework inspired the idea presented as 
‘methodological deficit’, which I believe is an interesting concept for analysing 
and understanding the Court’s work. Put differently, the details of the 
framework may be further discussed or improved – but the notion of 
methodological deficit provides for a noteworthy perspective on the dynamic 
between the components which build into the methodology with which the 
CJEU carries out its task. While I did not foresee this ‘sub-theory’ to the 
methodological framework when the work on this thesis began, it appears, in 
my view, to be a welcome tool to facilitate the understanding of the different 
methodological aspects of the Court’s work.  
 In terms of ‘future research’, a short comment will suffice. I will not argue 
that the methodological framework is a finished theoretical product nor a perfect 
theory of the CJEU’s methodology. Rather, I see the methodological framework 
as an interesting starting point for those interested in understanding the Court’s 
work, the Court’s methodology, and how the Court can provide its judgments 
with acceptance and legitimacy in the broader context within which it is 
embedded. As such, I believe that the institutional approach to law has been 
instrumental in order to employ a wider perspective when identifying the key 
components of the framework, which has enabled the theory to come closer to 
its intended purpose. Also, and this has been suggested above, I maintain that a 
theory which seeks to explain the CJEU’s work from a methodological point of 
view, would become the most useful if it was combined with a study of case law. 
The idea is thus that future research could use the methodological framework as 
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a starting point or a template against which conclusions from a study of the 
Court’s case law could be applied and analysed. I sustain that the strength of the 
approach in this thesis is that it has brought together the different views and perspectives 
pertaining to the Court’s methodology available in the EU legal research in one 
context. Hence, while the four components could of course be analysed further, 
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